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NOT IN MY BACKYARD: 
ON THE MORALITY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
SHARING IN REFUGEE LAW 
Tally Kritzman-Amir* 
INTRODUCTION 
awid is an asylum seeker from Eritrea who fled his country of 
nationality, the country where he was born and raised and in 
whose army he served.1 Dawid inarguably meets the definition of a refu-
gee: a person outside of his or her country of origin who has a “well-
founded fear of persecution” on account of his or her “nationality, race, 
religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”2 
In Dawid’s case, he qualifies as a refugee based on evidence that he suf-
fered extreme human rights abuse in Eritrea due to his membership in a 
religious minority group. Like most of the tens of thousands of Eritrean 
asylum seekers, Dawid migrated from Eritrea to Sudan.3 Conflict-
stricken, impoverished Sudan is both a country of origin for many refu-
gees and a country of asylum for others. In Sudan, Dawid can expect to 
gain refugee status, but it will be virtually meaningless, given that he will 
likely live impoverished in a refugee camp or elsewhere, or perhaps find 
undocumented employment. He will face restrictions preventing him 
from practicing his religious beliefs and eventually risk refoulement to 
                                                                                                             
 *  Hauser Research Scholar, New York University School of Law, 2008–2009; Lec-
turer, Tel Aviv University School of Law, 2005–2008; Fox International Fellow, Yale 
University, 2006–2007. I wish to thank for their valuable comments the many people 
with whom I discussed this paper: Professor Eyal Benvenisti, Professor Peter Schuck, 
Professor Stephen Wizner, Professor Hanoch Dagan, and Professor James Hathaway. I 
would also like to express my gratitude to the participants of the Fox Fellows Workshop 
at the Yale Center for International and Arial Studies and the participants of the Exercise 
of Public Authority by International Institutions Workshop from the Max Planck Institute 
and Tel Aviv University. 
 1. Interview with Dawid, in Tel-Aviv, Isr. (June 26, 2008). Dawid eventually left 
Sudan for Egypt and then went to Israel, where he is now seeking asylum along with a 
few thousand other Eritreans who escaped political or religious persecution, or evaded 
the draft. I met Dawid in the course of my work with the Refugee Rights Clinic at Tel-
Aviv University School of Law. Dawid’s situation is emblematic of many of the prob-
lems described and discussed in this Article. 
 2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 3. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), 
at the end of 2007, there were approximately 160,500 Eritrean refugees in Sudan. See 
UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT 2007, SUDAN 205–11 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr. 
org/publ/PUBL/4848fd3e2.pdf. 
D
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Eritrea.4 Nearly 200,000 Eritrean asylum seekers have faced the difficult 
decision of where to flee. For many morally arbitrary, yet practical rea-
sons, which have to do with geographical proximity and the fact that the 
Sudanese border is easier to cross, most Eritrean refugees flee to Sudan. 
Alternatively, other Eritrean asylum seekers escape to Ethiopia,5 a desti-
tute neighboring country against which Eritrea has been waging an ethnic 
war.6 A small minority flees to Italy, the former colonizer of Eritrea and 
a far wealthier option.7 In other words, Dawid, like most asylum seekers, 
sought refuge in a neighboring country that is the least likely place for 
him to find substantive protection and the ability to exercise his human 
rights. Only a small percentage of refugees manage to reach countries 
that have the resources to provide them with adequate protection. 
The story of Dawid exemplifies one of the most pressing questions in 
the context of refugees’ rights: when refugees leave their country of na-
tionality, which country is responsible for protecting and providing for 
them? It is generally undisputed that refugees are legally and morally 
entitled to at least some rights and that States have a legal8 and moral9 
                                                                                                             
 4. Nick Wadhams, Rights Group Accuses Sudan, Eritrea of Deporting Eritrean 
Refugees from Sudan, VOICE OF AM. NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/ 
english/archive/2007-12/2007-12-10voa35.cfm?CFID=18690007&CFTOKEN=98990357. 
 5. After Sudan, Ethiopia is home to the highest concentration of Eritrean asylum 
seekers. See UNHCR, 2007 GLOBAL TRENDS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSONS 15 (2008), available at http://www. 
unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4852366f2.pdf. 
 6. On the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, its ethnic and national dimensions and 
its economic effects on both countries, see UNFINISHED BUSINESS: ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA 
AT WAR (Dominique Jacquin-Berdal & Martin Plaut eds., 2005). 
 7. About 7000 Eritrean refugees were present in Italy at the end of 2007, according 
to UNHCR statistics. See supra note 3. 
 8. The legal basis of States’ obligation toward refugees is found in the Convention, 
supra note 2, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 
8791 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. Some of the principles of 
both have been recognized as principles of customary international law. GUY S. 
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126–27 (2d ed. 1996). In addition, 
this obligation is set forth in “soft law” norms such as UNHCR guidelines and hand-
books, and various human rights conventions and regional treaties, including the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], and the African Union’s Convention Governing the Spe-
cific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (Sept. 10, 1969), availa-
ble at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ae6b36018. 
 9. There are innumerable discussions of the nature and the source(s) of the duty of 
States toward refugees. Most are based on distributive justice theory, but some also adopt 
utilitarian, critical race theory, or feminist perspectives. See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, 
WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 
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obligation to protect these rights. Despite this agreement, States general-
ly prefer that refugees apply for asylum, rather than having refugees end 
up “in their backyard.” The disagreement begins when we ask the fol-
lowing questions: Which State will be responsible? Whose budget will 
bear the costs of protecting and assuring the socio-economic rights of 
refugees? And which State must divert resources traditionally dedicated 
to securing the rights of its nationals in order to secure the rights of refu-
gees? 
In a different context, David Miller discusses an analogous hypotheti-
cal in which a person has collapsed on the street.10 Miller argues that the 
victim is more likely to receive assistance if there is a single person, ra-
ther than several, passing by.11 This is true for several reasons, the most 
important of which, according to Miller, is that with several bystanders, 
there is no clear allocation of responsibility and no one is solely at fault 
should the victim die.12 The same phenomenon can be observed with the 
international community’s response to the challenge of refugee policy. 
Refugees from State B may seek asylum in State A, rather than in States 
C or D. While it is possible to provide explanations as to why State A has 
a moral responsibility to the refugees fleeing from State B, in a world of 
multiple States, it is more difficult to account for and allocate this re-
sponsibility. Where there are several state actors, why should State A 
have any more responsibility for the flight of the refugees from State B 
than would States C or D? 
                                                                                                             
116–17 (2002); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 35–51 (1983); Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Bor-
ders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987) [hereinafter Carens, Aliens and Citizens]; Joseph Carens, 
Immigration, Welfare and Justice, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 1 (1995); Howard F. 
Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distri-
butive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 40 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 1, 11–17 (2008); Jules 
L. Coleman & Sarah K. Harding, Citizenship, the Demand of Justice and the Moral Re-
levance of Political Borders, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 18, 38 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 
1995); David Miller, Justice and Global Inequality, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION AND 
WORLD POLITICS 187, 188 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
Miller, Justice and Global Inequality]. I will elaborate on these discussions in Part III of 
this Article. 
 10. David Miller, The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights 4 (Dept. of Pol. & Int’l 
Relations, Oxford Univ., Working Paper No. SJ006, 2007), available at http://www. 
politics.ox.ac.uk./research/ working_papers/ Human_rights_Miller.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 4–5. 
 12. Id. 
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There are three main reasons to consider the roles of States C and D, 
rather than just assuming that State A is responsible for providing for 
refugees.13 As Daniel Steinbock has noted: 
First, refugees do not move evenly around the globe, both because ref-
ugee-producing events are concentrated in particular countries or re-
gions, and because most refugees cannot seek sanctuary far from their 
countries of origin. Second, despite the benefits individual refugees 
might ultimately bring, refugee-receiving countries regard refugees as 
an unwanted burden in just about every way imaginable. Third, coun-
tries vary widely in their ability to cope with refugees in their territo-
ry.14 
This Article examines the roles that States A, B, C, and D should play 
in the refugee-protection scheme. I assume that each State’s legal15 and 
moral16 obligations to refugees are substantiated enough and do not re-
quire further elaboration. The term “refugee” will apply loosely, refer-
ring to both persons defined as refugees according to the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”)17 and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”),18 as well as per-
sons in refugee-like situations. Part I explains why the provision of assis-
tance to and protection of refugees is a responsibility-sharing problem. 
Part II discusses the moral considerations that ground responsibility-
sharing efforts in the context of refugee migration, and then Part III of-
fers specific criteria to govern the allocation of responsibility among 
countries. Part IV attempts to explain the basis of responsibility sharing 
in international law and international relations. Part V suggests some 
theoretical models of how the policy of responsibility sharing can be 
conducted. Finally, Part VI explores the institutional aspect of responsi-
bility sharing, examining which institutions are best equipped to regulate 
responsibility-sharing frameworks and outlining what their potential role 
could be. 
                                                                                                             
 13. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of U.S. Refu-
gee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 951, 985 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 985. 
 15. ICCPR, supra note 8. 
 16. See supra note 9. 
 17. Convention, supra note 2. 
 18. Protocol, supra note 8. 
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I.  PROTECTING AND PROVIDING FOR REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY SHARING19 
The immigration of refugees imposes a responsibility on host societies. 
This type of immigration is uninvited and often unwelcome, and carries a 
high price. To ensure their assimilation and protection, States receiving 
refugees must expend resources by providing them with housing, jobs, 
education, etc.20 
The States from which refugees originate are essentially creating an 
externality borne by the States that allow the immigrants to enter their 
borders. When States fail or are unable to provide for their citizens, their 
citizens seek provision elsewhere. Therefore, the policies or natural con-
ditions of the refugees’ home States create a cost not internalized by the 
States themselves, but rather assumed by others. Unlike other externali-
ties produced by States, this externality has critical long-term social con-
sequences for the countries bearing it. These consequences serve as a 
justification for the urgent need to resolve the externality or, at the very 
least, to minimize its burdens.21 
Usually, there is no particular moral justification as to why State A—
and not States C or D—should bear the externality of the refugees from 
State B. However, more often than not, most refugees from State B will 
end up migrating to State A rather than States C or D for any number of 
reasons: State A is closer to State B, making it easier and less expensive 
to travel; there is already an existing community of State B’s immigrants 
in State A, which might assist in assimilation; or there are cultural, reli-
gious, and linguistic links between the populations of State B and State 
A.22 
In one sense, State A might often be forced to receive the refugees of 
State B due to an externality of States C and D. This will occur when 
these States implement a policy, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
                                                                                                             
 19. In most current discussions on refugees or immigrants, the term “burden sharing” 
is used instead of “responsibility sharing.” This Article uses the latter term, though; the 
former is potentially offensive, as it reduces refugees and immigrants to an encumbrance. 
For a discussion of this term, see Gregor Noll, Risky Games?: A Theoretical Approach to 
Burden Sharing in the Asylum Field, 16 J. REFUGEE STUD. 236, 237 (2003). 
 20. Susan Martin et al., The Impact of Asylum on Receiving Countries, in POVERTY, 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 99, 103–05 (George J. Borjas & Jeff Crisp 
eds., 2005). 
 21. See Astri Suhrke, Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of 
Collective Versus National Action, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 396, 399 (1998). 
 22. For a detailed description of the different theoretical explanations of immigration 
patterns, see Douglas S. Massey et al., Theories of International Migration: A Review 
and Appraisal, 19 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 431 (1993). 
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that does not allow the entry of or does not attract immigrants from State 
B, thereby causing them to seek entry into State A alone. 
Another way to frame the dynamics among States A, C, and D is to 
view them as a “chicken game.”23 As immigration occurs throughout the 
world, most States prefer that others accept and provide for refugees. The 
second best option is for all of them to cooperate and distribute responsi-
bility for immigrants in a fair manner. And the least preferable option for 
most States is that the individual State alone has to bear responsibility for 
the immigrants. In this chicken game, State A, which is usually the im-
migrants’ preferred destination, is likely to restrict entry and withhold 
support and protection to signal to other States that it has no intention of 
providing for the immigrants.24 This could potentially lead to a race to 
the bottom and create incentives for States C and D to apply more re-
strictive measures.25 
Interestingly, State A is often not much better off than State B and, 
even more likely, State A has less resources compared to States C or D. 
Most refugees immigrate to poor and unstable neighboring countries,26 
imposing an additional burden on their politics and economies.27 This 
burden could be devastating to some countries, especially given the fact 
that refugee crises both arise suddenly and are vast in scope.28 For exam-
ple, crises in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have resulted in a mass 
                                                                                                             
 23. For additional perspectives on the “chicken game” in the context of international 
law and international relations, see, for example, Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the 
Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 
90 AM. J. INT’L. L. 384, 390 (1996). 
 24. For example, in an effort not to attract additional Eritrean asylum seekers, the 
Israeli government implemented a series of harsh policy measures, including arbitrary 
status changes, restrictions on freedom of movement, and imprisonment. See, e.g., Israel: 
Eritrean Asylum Seekers Told to Leave Tel Aviv Area, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. 
NETWORKS, Aug. 11, 2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,IRIN,, 
ISR,48a14919c,0.html. This has led neighboring governments like Egypt to take even 
harsher measures against Eritrean asylum seekers, such as deportation and barring access 
to the UNHCR. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Don’t Return Eri-
trean Asylum Seekers at Risk, Allow UNHCR Access to Detained Migrants (Dec. 19, 
2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/19/egypt-don-t-return-eritrean-
asylum-seekers-risk. 
 25. It should be noted that, at least in theory, there may be circumstances where 
States do not have such incentives, for example, if States seek to achieve or maintain a 
strong track record for human rights. 
 26. However, this situation could change in the future as globalization is spreading 
and it becomes easier and less expensive to move from one place to another. 
 27. James L. Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the Response 
of the International Community, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 3, 12–21 (1982). 
 28. Peter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 
243, 273 (1997). 
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influx of immigrants from one poor country in turmoil to another poor 
country in turmoil.29 Consequentially, the least politically and economi-
cally capable countries are forced to provide for the neediest immigrants 
and to share the greatest part of the responsibility in caring for them.30 
This phenomenon is coupled with the trend of Western countries tough-
ening their immigration and asylum laws.31 
The immigration of refugees to impoverished countries carries a soci-
opolitical price. Uneasy feelings, which may amount to xenophobia, 
sometimes arise among the citizens of host States because of the uneven 
distribution of the responsibility.32 Additionally, the immigration of refu-
gees may raise security concerns in host States as conflicts cross borders 
along with refugee movements. The economic impacts of refugee 
movements affect both the country’s nationals and refugees, who are un-
able to enjoy sufficient access to resources or to realize their rights. Per-
haps one of the most striking examples is the immigration of hundreds of 
thousands of people from Rwanda to Tanzania, which has caused much 
political instability and additional poverty, and raised security concerns 
in Tanzania.33 
Under the current legal regime, it is almost impossible to “correct” the 
disproportionate allocation of responsibility imposed by initial and sec-
ondary refugee flight patterns. Refugees are expected to find safety and 
                                                                                                             
 29. This is evident from a close inspection of the UNHCR statistical reports, which 
show migrations from countries of origin to neighboring and equally poor countries of 
asylum. See 2005 UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, CHAPTER II: POPULATION LEVELS 
AND TRENDS 2–4 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ 
opendoc.pdf?id=464049e53&tbl=STATISTICS. See also Benjamin Cook, Note, Methods 
in Its Madness: The Endowment Effect in an Analysis of Refugee Burden-Sharing and 
Proposed Refugee Market, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 333, 344 (2004). 
 30. Cook, supra note 29. 
 31. Suhrke, supra note 21, at 397. Suhrke argues that Western States that seek to 
minimize the number of refugees on their territory are actually “free-riders” in the collec-
tive effort to maintain global security. Id. at 400. 
 32. MATTHEW J. GIBNEY, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF ASYLUM: LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 246–47 (2004). 
 33. James Milner, Sharing the Security Burden: Towards the Convergence of Refugee 
Protection and State Security (Refugee Studies Cent., Working Paper No. 4, 2000), 
available at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/workingpaper4.pdf (detailing the burdens that 
Tanzania has assumed as a result of the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of 
Rwandans fleeing genocide). Another current example is the flight of Sudanese refugees 
to Chad, which resulted in the spillage of the conflict from Sudan into Chad and the de-
vastation of Chad’s economy. See also UNHCR, Real-time Evaluation of UNHCR’s IDP 
Operation in Eastern Chad, PDES/2007/02 – RTE 1 (July 2007) (prepared by Khassim 
Diagne and Enda Savage), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/RESEARCH/46a4ad 
450.pdf. 
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settle in the first country to which they move.34 The motivation behind 
this policy is to prevent refugees from “asylum shopping,” the underly-
ing assumption being that “shopping” for one’s favorite country is incon-
sistent with the concept of a refugee: a person fleeing for his or her life 
would apply for asylum in the first available State.35 Moreover, many 
wealthier nations employ policies preventing secondary flight in order to 
contain refugees in States neighboring their countries of origin, which 
are usually developing countries.36 In many cases, refugees who move to 
a third country must justify why they did not seek permanent refuge in 
the last country, and risk being denied asylum on this basis.37 Therefore, 
although immigrants initially seek refuge in State A for no morally com-
pelling reason, States C and D are unlikely to assume responsibility in 
any way for the well-being of the immigrants flooding into State A.38 
I would argue that the responsibility of protecting and providing for 
refugees must be solved through cooperation rather than allowing it to 
become the problem of a few random States. Responsibility for the well-
being of refugees must be shared internationally.39 Assuming a shared 
responsibility for refugee migration not only is fair and just, but also 
would be beneficial to world order and global security and help States to 
better plan their immigration policies. Moreover, this planning would 
benefit refugees, who could rely on a more organized and substantial 
system of protection. In the following sections, I will describe the rele-
vant moral and legal bases for this argument. 
                                                                                                             
 34. Kay Hailbronner, The Concept of “Safe Country” and Expeditious Asylum Pro-
cedures: A Western European Prospective, 5 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 31, 35 (1993). 
 35. See, e.g., Eiko R. Thielemann, Why EU Policy Harmonisation Undermines Refugee 
Burden-Sharing 9, 33 (Nat’l Europe Ctr. Paper No. 101, 2003), available at http://dspace-
dev.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1030.58/12325/2/Thielemann.pdf. 
 36. Hailbronner, supra note 34, at 36–48. 
 37. For more on the “Safe Third Country” policy in Europe and elsewhere, see, for 
example, id. 
 38. Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum 
Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
567, 570–71 (2003) (explaining how, on the one hand, States C and D are unlikely to 
grant protection to immigrants from State A and, on the other hand, are unlikely to con-
sider the scope of protection they receive in State A). 
 39. Cook, supra note 29, at 337–38. For a discussion of the general need to institutio-
nalize responsibility sharing with respect to other displaced persons, see generally J.P.L. 
Fonteyne, Burden Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International Soli-
darity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees, 8 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 162 (1980). 
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II. THE MORALITY OF RESPONSIBILITY SHARING AMONG STATES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF REFUGEE MIGRATION 
Despite innumerable moral discussions about the duty of States to-
wards immigrants, there are relatively few and only brief discussions 
about the morality of responsibility sharing with respect to immigration. 
Most scholars discuss responsibility sharing among States in economic 
terms, as a collective action problem or a public goods distribution prob-
lem.40 There seem to be two reasons for the lack of moral discussion on 
this issue. First, it is almost too obvious to assert that it is morally better 
and far fairer for States to cooperate and share responsibility instead of 
imposing costs on certain States in an arbitrary way. Second, States are 
disinclined to formalize a responsibility-sharing mechanism41 and, there-
fore, discussing the morality of responsibility sharing is seen as irrele-
vant. Consequently, most schools of thought and scholars theorizing 
about justice in immigration have not dealt with the question. Extrapolat-
ing scholars’ general position on this subject, however, we can develop a 
view of responsibility sharing that would conform to existing principles 
of migrant justice. In the following three Sections, I will explain the 
moral foundations of responsibility sharing according to several existing 
schools of thought. 
A. The Feminist Critique of International Law and the Ethics of Care 
The concepts of the feminist critique of international law shed light on 
the issue of responsibility sharing in refugee law. This school of thought 
argues that international legal concepts that appear gender neutral, such 
as States, boundaries, and sovereignty, are actually very male oriented 
and have a particularized impact on women.42 As Charlesworth, Chinkin, 
and Shelley Wright observe: 
A feminist account of international law suggests that we inhabit a world 
in which men of all nations have used the statist system to establish 
economic and nationalist priorities to serve male elites, while basic 
                                                                                                             
 40. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 29; Fonteyne, supra note 39; Noll, supra note 19; 
Schuck, supra note 28; Suhrke, supra note 21; Eiko R. Thielemann, Burden-Sharing or 
Free-Riding? Explaining Variations in States’ Acceptance of Unwanted Migration, 
available at http://aei.pitt.edu/423/01/EUSA2003-JRS-Thielemann.html. 
 41. See, e.g., David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193, 203 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman 
eds., 2005) (“[T]he best we can hope for is that informal mechanisms will continue to 
evolve which make all refugees the special responsibility of one state or another . . . .”). 
 42. Hilary Charlesworth et. al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 613, 614–15 (1991). 
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human, social and economic needs are not met. International institu-
tions currently echo these same priorities.43 
Although the feminist critique of international law encompasses a wide 
variety of views, I specifically examine the ethics of care approach, as it 
is the most relevant to our discussion. The ethics of care approach is 
based on the psychological research of Carol Gilligan,44 who analyzed 
the problem-solving attitudes of women and men in the hopes of deter-
mining whether women have a different “voice”—or approach—than 
men.45 Gilligan concluded that women apply an ethics of care approach 
and perceive things in terms of caring, context, communication, relation-
ships, and responsibility.46 Men, however, apply an ethics of rights or an 
ethics of justice approach, which leads them to conceive of problems in 
binary terms of right and wrong, or winners and losers, while applying 
logic and rationality, without taking into account context and relation-
ships.47 
The ethics of care approach also serves as a basis for the promotion of 
women’s interests.48 This theory recognizes the validity and potential of 
that “different voice,” finding that the ethics of care approach, with its 
relational, flexible, and caring notions, is often more appropriate and 
more moral than the ethics of rights approach.49 In the context of interna-
tional law, the promotion of the former has far-reaching consequences 
with respect to not only women, including refugee women, but also other 
subordinate groups, thereby revolutionizing international law and its 
fundamental concepts.50 Indeed, this approach has been used to critique 
and analyze various phenomena in international law and international 
relations: colonialism, international norms and the norm-making process, 
sovereignty, the treatment of Third World countries, and transnational 
institutions.51 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. at 615. 
 44. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
 45. Id. at 1–3. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 64–74, 164, 174. 
 48. See Charlesworth, supra note 42, at 618–19 (discussing this in terms of incorpo-
rating a feminist perspective into international law discourse).  
 49. Id. at 615–16 
 50. For example, the feminist theory was applied to the context of third world coun-
tries and their populations. Id. at 618–19. 
 51. For an overview of the “ethics of care” approach to international relations, see 
Fiona Robinson, Methods of Feminist Normative Theory: A Political Ethic of Care for 
International Relations, in FEMINIST METHODOLOGY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 221 
(Brooke A. Ackerly et al. eds., 2006). 
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With respect to immigration, the ethics of care approach diminishes the 
binary distinction between citizens and aliens, between “us” and “them.” 
This approach rejects a strong understanding of sovereignty and national-
ism and points to the fact that countries are interrelated and intercon-
nected.52 Embracing a more humanist-oriented approach, the ethics of 
care model supports a “relational” attitude to immigrants that opposes 
criminalizing many categories immigrants and that offers them protec-
tion, especially those who are vulnerable, such as refugees.53 The ethics 
of care approach upholds these positions both as a general policy rec-
ommendation and in recognition that women constitute a large, and often 
unheard and undocumented, percentage of immigrants.54 
The ethics of care approach acknowledges that much like children in 
certain circumstances, some immigrants cannot survive without care. In 
so doing, this approach challenges myths of self-sufficiency.55 From this 
conclusion derives the responsibility of States to protect refugees and 
provide for them. 
Feminist theorists adopting the ethics of care approach would perceive 
the responsibility-sharing debate in the context of refugees to be errone-
ous in that it maintains an “us” versus “them” distinction, rather than 
looking at the responsibilities of all States for all the world’s immigrants. 
Such theorists argue for a “softer” perception of States as units for the 
redistribution of wealth.56 In fact, they would claim that this discussion 
distances countries that receive immigrants, the North, from the immi-
grants’ countries of origin, the problematic South, without acknowledg-
ing the North’s complicity in the environmental, economic, and political 
                                                                                                             
 52. J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURITY 64–66 (1992). 
 53. On the need for greater protection of women in refugee law, see, for example, 
Amy M. Lighter Steill, Incorporating the Realities of Gender and Power into U.S. Asy-
lum Law Jurisprudence, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 445 (2005). 
 54. Saskia Sassen, Rätt väg?—Immigration I en Global Era [Is This the Way to 
Go?—Handling Immigration in a Global Era] 4–5 ORD&BILD (2002), translated in 4 
STAN. AGORA 1, 5 (2003) (constructively adopting the “ethics of care” approach). On the 
role of women in immigration law, see Nancy Ann Root & Sharyn A. Tejani, Undocu-
mented: The Roles of Women in Immigration Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 605 (1994). 
 55. Virginia Held explores this issue further in the context of counterterrorism policy. 
Virginia Held, Morality in International Relations (Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). 
 56. For example, perhaps echoing this perspective, one theorist has argued for a “sof-
ter” perception of States as units for the redistribution of wealth. Robinson, supra note 
51, at 236–39. 
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destabilization of the South.57 Responsibility, they would argue, need not 
be divided among States in a mathematical manner using set criteria, but 
rather should be shared by States in a more generous and flexible fa-
shion. 
B. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism provides additional insights regarding the importance of 
responsibility sharing. The utilitarian point of view measures moral value 
according to whether it increases or decreases the total amount of bene-
fit.58 Applying this school of thought, utility is likely to increase in the 
most significant manner if States cooperate with each other to share re-
sponsibility for protecting refugees.59 In other words, cooperation could 
lead to a regime under which responsibility for each refugee would be 
borne by the State whose utility declines the least as a result.60 Generally 
speaking, due to the principle of diminishing marginal utility, utility will, 
in fact, accumulate under a fairer regime of responsibility sharing in ref-
ugee protection.61 This is also, as Joseph Carens puts it, because “the uti-
litarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the assumption that 
everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is 
calculated.”62 Thus, utilitarianism seems to support responsibility sharing 
in the context of refugee protection based on the relative costs different 
States potentially face and their impact on the overall utility. 
From a utilitarian point of view, one potential problem with immigra-
tion is “the tragedy of the commons.”63 If responsibility for the protec-
tion of refugees is shared, it may discourage a country from improving 
                                                                                                             
 57. See, e.g., Nahla Valji, Women and the 1951 Convention: Fifty Years of Seeking 
Visibility, 19(5) REFUGE 25, 31 (2001), available at http://www.yorku.ca/crs/Refuge/ 
Abstracts%20and%20Articles/Vol%2019%20No%205/Valji.pdf. 
 58. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1895). 
 59. See James L. Hudson, The Philosophy of Immigration, 8 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 
51, 52–53 (1986). 
 60. Thielemann, supra note 40. 
 61. Economic research has been inconclusive regarding the economic effects of im-
migration. See George J. Borjas, Introduction, in ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
IMMIGRATION 2 (George J. Borjas ed., 2000). The same is likely true if we consider the 
marginal utility of noneconomic factors, such as culture and national identity. 
 62. Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 9, at 263. This commitment to principles 
of equality has led Howard F. Chang to conclude that discrimination between noncitizens 
and citizens is as morally unjust as, for example, discrimination between African Ameri-
cans and whites. Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and 
the Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 40 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 11, 17 (2007) [hereinafter Chang, The Economics of International Labor]. 
 63. For further reading on the concept of “tragedy of the commons,” see Garrett Har-
din, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
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its own economic situation; since such improvement may result in a 
more significant portion of the responsibility for refugees. This might 
affect the incentives of individuals to contribute to their State, which 
might, in turn, affect the utility.64 With respect to refugees, the most 
commonly expressed concern is that they cause a drop in national in-
come, as they benefit from the good of a society to which they did not 
contribute. To some extent, national utility correlates with national in-
come. It should be noted, though, that utility and income are not identic-
al, since utility is comprised of nonfiscal parameters. 
However, research has demonstrated that States will have incentives to 
increase their share of the responsibility because it may increase national 
income.65 Even without considering the income increase of new immi-
grants, there is reason to expect an income increase for the natives of the 
State to which these immigrants arrive.66 The only negative economic 
effects of immigration are on the incomes of low-wage native em-
ployees, but these can be corrected through distributive measures, such 
as taxation.67 
It should be noted that although maximizing utility is an important 
consideration in immigration debates,68 other political and moral consid-
                                                                                                             
 64. This is comparable to efficiency arguments made in the context of property law 
theory, particularly domestic takings law. With regard to takings law, it has been argued 
that full compensation is crucial in providing incentives for owners to invest in their 
property. The concern raised is that giving people a share of someone else’s property 
through a taking without fully compensating the property owner will discourage people 
from investing in their private property, as they will fear losing it to others, who did not 
invest. However, research shows that full compensation fails to provide as much of an 
incentive as a progressive compensation regime does. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and 
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 748–56 (1999). 
 65. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Wel-
fare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. REV. 1147, 1149 (1997) [hereinafter 
Chang, Liberalization Immigration]. 
 66. Chandran Kukathas, The Case for Open Immigration, in CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 207, 212 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman 
eds., 2005); Chang, The Economics of International Labor, supra note 62, at 4–5. 
 67. A comprehensive discussion of the measures for redistributing income and other 
profits among high- and low-wage native employees and immigrants is beyond the scope 
of this Article. For such a discussion, see Chang, Liberalization Immigration, supra note 
65. According to Chang, the concern sometimes raised that increasing the share of re-
sponsibility and admitting more immigrants will impose a greater burden of taxation can 
be refuted by the fact that immigrants will also be taxed on their income as soon as they 
are employed in their State of immigration. Additionally, the burden of taxation does not 
have to be increased if immigrants are not fully integrated into the State’s welfare system. 
Id. at 1155. 
 68. See Robert W. McGee, Essay: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Prop-
erty Rights and Immigration Policy, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 496–500 (1994). 
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erations should also be taken into account when forming immigration 
policies. 
C. Distributive Justice Theory 
Finally, distributive justice theory provides a more complex analysis of 
the significance of responsibility sharing with respect to refugees. Since 
there are countless discussions on immigration and distributive justice, I 
will focus on the analyses that are most substantially relevant to respon-
sibility sharing.69 
One interesting approach is that of “cosmopolitan egalitarianism,” the 
roots of which can be traced back to the writings of John Rawls.70 Rawls 
puts forth an original position on how to form just social institutions.71 
These institutions are characterized by the fact that their decisions should 
be made using “a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be 
just.”72 According to Rawls, parties should shield themselves behind “the 
veil of ignorance” so that they are unaware of their own traits and are not 
biased by self-interest when deciding which option is fairer.73 The parties 
are to have no knowledge of morally arbitrary factors, such as ability, 
class, political situation, and social status.74 They should know, however, 
the key characteristics of their society and culture, though not about the 
implications of these factors for themselves.75 Rawls claims that these 
conditions would guarantee just resolutions.76 In Rawls’ hypothetical, 
parties choosing among options behind the “veil of ignorance” are ex-
pected to apply the “maximum rule for choice under uncertainty.”77 In 
other words, parties will adopt “the alternative . . . [according to which] 
the worst outcome . . . is superior to the worst outcome of others.”78 As 
posited by Rawls, two principles of justice are bound to the result. The 
first position is that “each person is to have an equal right to the most 
                                                                                                             
 69. For additional discussions on distributive justice aspects of immigration, which 
coincidentally touch upon responsibility-sharing issues, see, for example, SEYLA 
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 9–12 (2004); 
WALZER, supra note 9, at 46–48; Coleman & Harding, supra note 9, at 38; 
 70. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, PEOPLES]. 
 71. See generally RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 136. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 136–37. 
 75. Id. at 137 
 76. Id. at 136–37. 
 77. Id. at 152. 
 78. Id. at 152–53. 
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extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”79 
The second position is that “social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to every-
one’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”80 
Although Rawls did not intend for this notion of justice to be applied 
internationally,81 his ideas were further developed by cosmopolitan egali-
tarians,82 who argue that since nationality is a morally arbitrary trait and 
therefore should remain behind “the veil of ignorance,” States have the 
same compelling duty towards noncitizens as they have towards their 
own citizens.83 This theoretical paradigm can also ground claims for 
open borders. Such theorists claim that States interact in the most signifi-
cant ways, especially in terms of participation in institutions, economy, 
and commerce, and are not independent of each other or isolated.84 If, 
unlike Rawls seems to imply, States are not perceived as “self-
contained,” then there is support for thinking of an international original 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. at 60. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Rawls applies his principles of justice within a “self contained national communi-
ty,” meaning a national community self-sufficient and territorially defined by borders. Id. 
at 457. Rawls attempts to distinguish States from peoples in a manner that I find rather 
unconvincing, though I will not dwell upon this issue. It should be noted that Rawls 
seems to think that “peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.” Id. at 37. 
Thus, “well-ordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies in their attempt to” 
achieve order. Wilfried Hinsch, Global Distributive Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 54, 62 
(Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001). It does not appear, however, that Rawls believes wealth 
should be transferred from richer to poorer societies. For a detailed critique of Rawls’ 
position, see, for example, id. at 62–66. Other philosophers support Rawls’ conclusion 
stated above. Nevertheless, much like Rawls, his supporters maintain that this duty 
should not be interpreted to support “ethical egoism,” but rather assume the form of hu-
manitarian assistance by governments or by international nongovernmental organizations 
to minimize global poverty, regardless of one’s conception of justice. See, e.g., Michael 
Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 
(2001); Stephen Macedo, What Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universal-
ism, Diversity and the Law of Peoples, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2004); Thomas 
Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 118–19, 128, 132 
(2005). 
 82. I refer in the following paragraphs mostly to the ideas of the two most prominent 
scholars within this school of thought, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. For others’ 
discussions of the application of distributive justice in the global sphere, see, for example, 
Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 9; Joseph Carens, Immigration, Welfare and Jus-
tice, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 9, at 1. 
 83. Timothy King, Immigration from Developing Countries: Some Philosophical 
Issues, 93 ETHICS 525, 527 (1983). 
 84. Charles R. Beitz, Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism, 75 INT’L AFF. 515, 518–
21 (1999). 
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position similar to the one described by Rawls above, where the same 
principles of justice apply.85 In the international sphere, wealth would be 
distributed to maximize the benefit for the least well-off persons and 
States.86 As such, this point of view is a sophisticated twist on egalita-
rianism, protecting substantial, rather than formal, equality. 
By extension of the theories outlined above, cosmopolitan egalitarians 
would support a responsibility-sharing regime that works to the advan-
tage of the least prosperous countries and the least prosperous refugees. 
According to this school of thought, if States remain behind the hypo-
thetical “veil of ignorance” and do not consider the risks that they will 
incur as a result of disasters in other States, they will likely promote and 
contribute to a responsibility-sharing regime.87 
David Miller offers a rather different take on responsibility sharing, 
presenting it as a distributive justice problem. Although his discussion is 
general and not specific to immigration, Miller offers rather concrete 
guidelines for responsibility sharing. Calling this a problem of “remedial 
responsibility” he argues that 
agents should be held remedially responsible for situations when, and 
to the extent that they were responsible for bringing those situations 
about . . . . [W]e look to the past to see how the deprivation and suffer-
ing that concern us arose, and having established that, we are then able 
to assign remedial responsibility.88 
                                                                                                             
 85. THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 241 (1989). 
 86. CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 150–53 
(1979). 
 87. Compare this with the idea of insurance introduced by Dworkin. RONALD 
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 331–40 (2000). 
Dworkin addresses the possibility of insurance as a substitute for welfare policies, al-
though his discussion is entirely unconnected to immigration. The decision to take out 
insurance is made without awareness of the actual risk to one’s employment, only with 
respect to one’s fears and willingness to take risks. The idea of insurance can be applied 
at the international level, with each country deciding how willing it is to risk a mass in-
flux of immigrants, without knowing the likelihood that such an influx will occur. Japan, 
which values its social homogeneity, would likely be willing to pay more to insure itself 
against migrants. Israel, which values its Jewish character, might do the same. Other 
countries might not. For further discussion on the concept of insurance in the context of 
responsibility sharing, see, for example, Thielemann, supra note 40. 
 88. The rationales behind the principle of remedial responsibility are somewhat simi-
lar to those of tort law. David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 
455 (2001). 
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Miller believes that moral responsibility, rather than merely causal re-
sponsibility, should affect the assignment of remedial responsibility.89 
For example, a specific State should assist refugees if its policies contri-
buted to their situation, either by acting affirmatively or by refraining 
from taking positive action.90 
Furthermore, Miller maintains that remedial responsibility should be 
assigned to a specific agent based on its superior capacity to end a moral-
ly concerning situation.91 Miller would therefore argue that in the context 
of refugee policy, the most appropriate State to bear the responsibility of 
assisting refugees is the one that has the best capacity to do so. Since us-
ing State capacity as a criterion is both complex and problematic in creat-
ing disincentives,92 Miller would suggest applying this principle only 
after identifying those agents that have a special responsibility for caus-
ing refugee flight.93 
Miller offers an additional principle according to which responsibility 
should be assigned to a particular State. Under the communitarian prin-
ciple, Miller assumes that agents feel a greater sense of responsibility 
towards those with whom they share communal ties as compared to those 
with whom they do not.94 However, Miller recognizes that this principle 
cannot be used for all responsibility-distribution purposes because there 
may be circumstances where no specific agent has communal ties with 
the victim population and there may be occasions in which an agent with 
no communal ties is the only one in a position to assist.95 Additionally, 
this principle does not help to determine which State within a community 
is in the best position to be held responsible.96 So, in many occasions, 
applying the communitarian principle could prove to be not very useful. 
In order to determine which agent or agents should bear remedial respon-
sibility, Miller suggests that, in any specific situation, we should weigh 
their capacity and their communal ties.97 
As we can see, distributive justice literature contributes significantly to 
this discussion. While the principles of cosmopolitan egalitarianism pro-
vide general support for burden sharing, Miller’s writing offers more 
                                                                                                             
 89. Miller explains that the concept of moral responsibility is one of causal responsi-
bility. See id. at 457. 
 90. Often it is difficult to draw the line as to what constitutes moral responsibility. 
See id. at 457–59. 
 91. Id. at 460–61. 
 92. Id. at 460–62. 
 93. Id. at 462. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 462–64. 
 96. Id. at 463. 
 97. Id. at 468. 
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concrete and specific factors. I will elaborate on these and other consid-
erations in the following Part. 
III. CRITERIA TO DETERMINE THE DIVISION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY 
Given the above-mentioned moral considerations, in particular those 
discussed by David Miller, a critical question remains: how should re-
sponsibility be apportioned among States? Several criteria are relevant to 
this determination. This Part of the Article will review the main criteria, 
explaining why they should be the central considerations for responsibili-
ty sharing. Interestingly, these factors are very similar to those affecting 
the scope of States’ duty to accept immigrants, as discussed in Part I.98 
Perhaps the most important factor in determining responsibility sharing 
is what I would like to call a country’s “absorption capacity,” which is, 
by and large, a socio-economic criterion.99 Here absorption capacity re-
fers to a State’s ability to endure additional responsibility in a way that, 
from a functionalist point of view, will not dramatically affect the State 
or will not radically influence its economy. This is an umbrella term that 
can be measured by assessing several indicators, such as a country’s 
gross national product (“GNP”), average life expectancy, demand for 
employment, and land reserves.100 A country that lacks financial re-
sources or suffers from low life expectancy, widespread unemployment, 
or scarcity of land resources is likely to be unable to provide for its own 
citizens, let alone for additional persons.101 
In many cases, it is possible to draw a correlation between the general 
willingness of States to welcome immigration or to extend foreign aid, 
and their absorption capacity. Countries such as Canada or Australia, 
whose absorption capacities are high given their GNPs, strong demands 
                                                                                                             
 98. See Part I. 
 99. This consideration links well to David Miller’s capacity criterion, because a 
State’s capacity to take in immigrants is closely connected to its economic capabilities. 
See discussion supra Part II.C. In some cases, absorption capacity may also be connected 
to the moral responsibility criterion if a GNP has risen as a result of the exploitation of 
refugees’ States of origin and this exploitation caused their immigration. See discussion 
supra Part II.C. 
 100. These are the economic criteria scholars often mention when considering factors 
that should inform responsibility sharing. However, they are certainly not exclusive. Oth-
er examples of economic criteria include “population density and the quality of the envi-
ronmental infrastructure.” See Jonathan Seglow, The Ethics of Immigration, 3 POL. STUD. 
REV. 317, 330 (2005). 
 101. Grahl-Madsen has referred to this as the “refugee per GNP” criterion, suggesting 
that there should be a correlation between a country’s economic situation and its share of 
responsibility for the protection of refugees. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Ways and Prospects, 
21/30 AWR BULL. 278 (1983). See also Noll, supra note 19. 
2009] NOT IN MY BACKYARD 373 
for labor, and vast land reserves, have demonstrated interest in receiving 
additional immigrants.102 Accordingly, they could be assigned a large 
share of the responsibility for the protection of refugees.103 
Geographic proximity is currently one of the dominant considerations 
for deciding which country should bear such responsibility. This is be-
cause a geographically proximate country is likely to be the first country 
of asylum and, as such, will likely have to provide for the refugees who 
arrive at its borders. This practice in itself is not sufficiently morally jus-
tifiable. Geographical proximity is only a viable consideration if we as-
sume that neighboring countries generally tend to have some sort of spe-
cial solidarity bonds among them or to be particularly responsible for 
each others’ situation. This assumption is oftentimes true, since in many 
cases neighboring countries are members of regional organizations and 
parties to regional covenants.104 While proximity relates well to Miller’s 
above-mentioned communitarian principle or remedial responsibility 
principle,105 this is not always the case. 
The underlying logic behind this criterion is “special solidarity bonds.” 
Special solidarity bonds do not always exist among neighboring coun-
tries, but may exist among geographically distant States. For example, 
these bonds may exist between former colonial powers and former colo-
nies,106 States with strong financial or cultural ties, and countries that are 
                                                                                                             
 102. For more on the connection between Australia’s economic situation and resettle-
ment program, see Glenn Nicholls, Unsettling Admissions: Asylum Seekers in Australia, 
11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 61 (1998). 
 103. It should be noted that using a country’s absorption capacity as a factor for appor-
tioning responsibility should follow the same logic as implementing a relative or progres-
sive taxation system. 
 104. As I will demonstrate in the following sections, the issue of geographical prox-
imity is central to the proposal made by Hathaway and Neve. See James C. Hathaway & 
R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
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 105. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 106. Jürgen Habermas argues that First World States have an obligation to absorb 
Third World immigrants as a way of atoning for the evils of colonialism. Jürgen Habermas, 
Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic and Constitutional State, in MULTICUL-
TURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 107, 141 (Shierry Weber Nocholsen 
trans., Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). To the extent that colonial powers are morally responsi-
ble for the immigration of refugees, Habermas’ position corresponds with Miller’s moral 
responsibility criterion. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The special connection 
of asylum seekers and former colonizers is also apparent from the example given in the 
introduction to this Article; many Eritreans flee to Italy, which colonized Eritrea. 
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otherwise in an alliance. This notion correlates with the ethics of care 
justification to responsibility sharing.107 
Responsibility may also be attributed to a State when it has an exploit-
ative relationship with the refugee’s State of origin.108 For example, one 
State may exploit the natural resources or work power of another, result-
ing in the immigration of refugees. Such a case would comport with Mil-
ler’s argument on remedial responsibility’s connection to moral and 
causal responsibility.109 If a State is responsible in some other way for 
the immigration of refugees, then it should also bear the responsibility of 
providing for them. The exploiting State would also internalize the costs 
of its exploitation. For instance, a State could be responsible for negli-
gently polluting the air, water, or land of another State, prompting the 
immigration of persons in a refugee-like situation due to ecological dam-
ages. Much like the case of exploitation, the State should bear the costs 
of its actions by providing for the refugees. It should be observed that 
this consideration could be applied to impose responsibility on States of 
origin, when their own harmful, negligent, or oppressive policies cause 
refugees to flee to other countries. 
In this context, it is also important to consider the effect of a responsi-
bility-sharing regime on the incentives of countries of origin. For exam-
ple, more generous protection policies, which may result from a better 
responsibility-sharing regime, could, in some sociopolitical circums-
tances, discourage a State of origin from adopting more efficient policies 
or more just rules of resource distribution. Thus, it could be argued that 
policymakers should consider the effects of responsibility-sharing mod-
alities among receiving States on the incentives and behavior of States of 
origin. For example, these modalities could try to incorporate the State of 
origin as one of the States shouldering part of the costs and burdens in-
volved.110 We might consider a related scenario, in which, under a gener-
ous protection regime, a State of origin might create policies designed to 
cause mass flight as a means of putting pressure on the receiving 
State(s). Responsibility-sharing mechanisms should create incentives to 
prevent such behavior. 
Other relevant criteria relate to cultural and ethnic considerations. 
Countries resisting immigration may claim that they are culturally dis-
tinct; maintain a certain demographic structure; are too homogenous, 
resulting in a low assimilation rate for foreigners; or have special cultural 
                                                                                                             
 107. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 108. See Miller, Justice and Global Inequality, supra note 9, at 204–09. 
 109. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 110. See infra Part V.E. 
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or ethnic characteristics that should be protected from foreigners.111 
These issues relate back to Miller’s capacity criterion,112 as the cultural 
and demographic profile of a State closely tracks its ability to assimilate 
incoming refugees. Comparing the capacities of different States is chal-
lenging, however, as capacity is a very abstract concept; accordingly, it is 
difficult to form policy recommendations based on this set of criteria. A 
theory should be developed to determine when a country’s cultural or 
ethnic claim is justified and when it should be rejected,113 though this is 
beyond the scope of my inquiry.114 On the other hand, if a specific group 
of refugees has some cultural or ethnic affinity or other type of a rela-
tionship with a particular State,115 then it might be justifiable to require 
that State to take a larger share of the responsibility.116 For example, it 
might make sense for Israel to take a larger share of the responsibility 
towards Jewish refugees, as it was designed to be a Jewish State and 
Jewish immigrant are most likely to fit into its society. 
In sum, it seems that a fairer responsibility-sharing system using estab-
lished criteria should replace the current, arbitrary distribution of respon-
sibility. As mentioned above, in the majority of cases, the most important 
criterion according to which responsibility should be distributed is 
wealth related, since providing for refugees is mainly perceived as a se-
rious economic burden. Yet, wealth is not the only consideration. I have 
attempted to offer a concise list of additional criteria that should be con-
sidered when forming a responsibility-sharing regime, elaborating on 
Miller’s use of capacity and solidarity. Over all, wealthier countries with 
stronger absorption abilities should bear more responsibility than poorer 
countries. In addition, countries that have a specific bond of solidarity 
with countries of origin should bear more responsibility than those that 
do not. Finally, countries responsible for the immigration should be re-
quired to internalize some, if not all, of the costs of providing for the 
immigrants. As Miller concludes, these different considerations should 
                                                                                                             
 111. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 280. 
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be applied simultaneously and balanced against each other.117 Criteria 
should be applied in a flexible and generous manner, through negotiation 
and discussion, rather than imposition or mathematics.118 
IV.  RESPONSIBILITY SHARING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
This part of the Article moves beyond the moral issues raised by re-
sponsibility sharing to the more legal and practical aspects of the prob-
lem. While discussions on the moral issues of responsibility sharing are 
rare, international law does touch upon them, albeit in rather general 
terms. International law cites the need for responsibility sharing in ad-
dressing the problems of climate change, pollution, security, peace-
keeping, and even immigration specifically.119 International legal norms 
establish general principles of responsibility sharing, but almost always 
refrain from providing specifics, leaving it to the States to determine the 
important considerations and responsibility-sharing mechanisms. 
Responsibility sharing as a general, fundamental principle in interna-
tional law is reflected in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Article 55 commits Member States to promote “higher stan-
dards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development.”120 In Article 56, Member States also pledge 
“to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization” 
in order to achieve these ends.121 These principles are further elaborated 
in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations,122 the 1966 International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,123 and the 1986 Declaration on 
the Right to Development.124 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees also emphasizes the 
importance of international responsibility sharing. In its preamble, the 
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Convention specifically recognizes the principle of responsibility sharing 
with respect to refugees.125 Moreover, the key principle of the Conven-
tion, the principle of nonrefoulement,126 prevents States from deporting 
persons to other countries where their lives, physical safety, or freedom 
would be at risk. This principle arguably forces States to negotiate re-
sponsibility sharing because it bars States from “dumping” refugees in 
other countries.127 Since 1951, there have been some efforts to promote 
additional agreements on responsibility sharing for specific refugee cris-
es, however they were unsuccessful, as there were insufficient incentives 
to cooperate and the agreements were not enforced.128 This seems to have 
been the result of the fact that, instead of cooperating with other States 
and sharing the responsibility, some countries prefer to adopt stricter asy-
lum laws, which lower their responsibility for assisting refugees, thereby 
shifting it to other countries.129 
Despite the rhetoric of many governments and international organiza-
tions,130 and the general norms of international laws that display a prima 
facie commitment to responsibility sharing,131 the responsibility of pro-
viding for refugees remains unevenly distributed.132 Some countries 
avoid accepting refugees in the hopes that other countries will assist 
them instead.133 Ad hoc international responsibility-sharing efforts have 
been undertaken in the past, but historically, they have only been sporad-
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ically successful because these efforts were not tied to a strong moral 
sense of duty.134 Regional instruments, while playing a significant role in 
the geographic area of their parties, fail to offer a comprehensive resolu-
tion to the problem of responsibility sharing.135 Therefore, international 
mechanisms based on the principles of need and equity must still be es-
tablished. 
V. MECHANISMS OF RESPONSIBILITY SHARING 
Given that international law refrains from defining the specifics of re-
sponsibility sharing, this task is left to the States. The promise behind 
crafting responsibility-sharing mechanisms is that they will assist in allo-
cating responsibility among the different States.136 Developing such me-
chanisms is difficult, mostly because the States that do not presently bear 
their share of responsibility have little incentive to participate. Moreover, 
countries currently bearing a lesser burden are the developed countries, 
which tend to have a significant influence on the establishment of inter-
national institutes and regimes. 
Nevertheless, several types of international responsibility-sharing me-
chanisms are possible. Generally, these mechanisms should seek to pro-
mote a more just distribution of responsibility, according to the moral 
principles outlined in Parts II and III of this Article. Some mechanisms 
would also aim to decrease the burden on host States by decreasing the 
number of refugees.137 In the following Sections, I will first describe six 
possible responsibility-sharing mechanisms and illustrate the possible 
impacts on hypothetical States A, B, C, and D. Then, I will discuss how 
each of these options interrelates. 
A. Quotas per Country 
The first mechanism of responsibility sharing is for States to have quo-
tas for refugees. This means that States C and D will have to absorb 
some of the refugees from State B who have reached State A. Under this 
regime, States A, C, and D will predetermine the specific percentage of 
refugees that they will each accept, irrespective of the tendency of the 
majority of immigrants to flee to State A. Essentially, this solution phys-
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ically redistributes the immigrants among the different countries in a 
fairer way.138 
To some extent, this mechanism has already been implemented. Some 
countries allow the resettlement of refugees coming from a different first 
State of asylum.139 However, these countries are few and far between, 
and they do so merely due to their sense of responsibility or for self-
interested reasons, and not due to any formal arrangement.140 
This proposed solution, though, is somewhat problematic, as it requires 
uprooting persons from the countries to which they fled and exposing 
them to the trauma of a second migration. In fact, when systematically 
and bureaucratically applied, this mechanism could result in additional 
human rights violations in the form of institutionalized, large-scale 
forced removal.141 According to James Hathaway, this approach could be 
dangerous; it allows governments to move persons from one State to 
another without regard to the quality of protection they might receive.142 
Refuge quotas are likewise destructive to immigrant communities, which 
provide a huge source of comfort and assistance. These communities are 
shattered when the immigrants are distributed among different coun-
tries.143 
Additionally, it is unclear whether this proposed solution will eventual-
ly lead to an even distribution of responsibility. For example, although 
State C may receive a proportionate number of refugees from State B, 
depending on the education, skills, and wealth of the migrant population 
itself, the refugees may benefit and contribute to State C, rather than ex-
haust its resources. In this circumstance, State C absorbs a population 
that triggers fewer costs, while State A must still incur the costs of refu-
gees unable to bring assets to the State. To the degree that it is possible, 
the distribution of immigrants should take into consideration the special 
characteristics of the persons and countries in a way that minimizes the 
responsibility and maximizes the efficiency. However, this optimization 
might be too complicated to actualize. 
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B. Regional or Group Responsibility-Sharing Solutions 
Hathaway and Neve argue that regional or group arrangements for re-
sponsibility sharing are the most effective solution.144 They believe that 
the pattern of cooperation should be “common but differentiated respon-
sibility.”145 Under this mechanism, each group of States will 
agree in advance to contribute to protect refugees who arrive at the ter-
ritory of any state member of the group. States will cooperate in a man-
ner akin to participation in an insurance scheme . . . [and] minimize 
their particularized risks by joining with others to make protection feas-
ible throughout the territories of all interest-convergence group member 
states.146 
Hathaway and Neve maintain that regional or group mechanisms 
would allow States to contribute honestly to the responsibility-sharing 
efforts according to each State’s particular constraints and resources.147 
Cooperation within such groups could be achieved more easily through 
an international arrangement, mostly because smaller groups can better 
coordinate their efforts and have a greater incentive to do so, as the costs 
of refugee flight are felt more locally.148 Also, this mechanism is more 
efficient in dissociating the site of first arrival from the place of asylum, 
creating an incentive for States to take an interest in the treatment of ref-
ugees in other countries.149 This approach has been adopted in Europe, 
where, in 2000, the European Refugee Fund (“ERF”) was formed to as-
sist responsibility-sharing efforts among the European States.150 Also, the 
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Dublin Accord regulates responsibility sharing among members of the 
European Union.151  
Although groups of States or neighboring States will sometimes have 
more incentive to cooperate regarding refugees, Hathaway and Neve are 
unable to explain why States would be willing to form these collective 
arrangements for responsibility sharing.152 Moreover, they themselves 
criticize this mechanism for imposing additional burdens on developing 
nations.153 It seems that this mechanism is, therefore, unlikely to redistri-
bute the responsibility more fairly, and might even result in institutiona-
lizing an unfair redistribution of responsibility.154 The European example 
cited above only illustrates the point that although some countries are 
willing to form group responsibility-sharing mechanisms, they do so with 
countries that have similar economic resources and encounter a similar 
risk in having to protect and provide for refugees. We can anticipate that 
most countries will be reluctant to join group mechanisms with countries 
that face a larger risk or have lesser socio-economic resources. 
C. Funding Assistance or Global Taxation 
An alternative mechanism of international responsibility sharing simp-
ly accepts the fact that immigrants tend to favor certain countries. This 
mechanism seeks to facilitate a fairer division of the costs and responsi-
bilities associated with refugees by transferring funds from one State to 
another. One way of implementing this idea is to have the States that 
bear a disproportionately small amount of the responsibility proportional-
ly compensate the States that bear a disproportionately large percentage 
of the responsibility.155 This solution requires States to cover the costs of 
providing for refugees even if they did not receive any immigrants. Es-
sentially, it is a mechanism for distributing the costs of providing for ref-
ugees through a system of global taxation. 
Calculating these costs is somewhat difficult, as they should not only 
take into account the out-of-pocket money spent on needy migrants. The 
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calculation should also consider the social costs and indirect burdens, 
which include long-term and short-term costs as well as the benefits the 
host country will enjoy as a result of the refugees’ immigration.156 Oth-
erwise, over- or under-compensation might occur. Due to the complexity 
of a compensation regime, it seems somewhat impractical. An additional 
variation of this mechanism, as offered by Schuck, is that assistance to 
refugee-hosting countries should not be limited to monetary contribution, 
but rather should include political assistance, transference of commodi-
ties, and so on.157 
D. The Trading of Quotas 
Schuck provides yet another possible mechanism for responsibility 
sharing, which, in one sense, is a combination of a few of the above-
mentioned solutions.158 This mechanism seems to be inspired by the 
Coase Theorem.159 The principles of the mechanism, as described by 
Schuck, are as follows: 
(1) agreement by states in a region on a strong norm that all ought to 
bear a share of temporary protection and permanent resettlement needs 
proportionate to their burden-bearing capacity; (2) a process for deter-
mining the number of those who need such protection; (3) a set of crite-
ria for allocating this burden among states in the form of quotas; (4) a 
market in which states can purchase and sell quota compliance obliga-
tions; and (5) an international authority to administer the quota system 
and regulate this market.160 
The idea is that countries will determine proportional refugee quotas 
among themselves, and if they are unable or unwilling to assume their 
share of the responsibility, they can then trade it to another country.161 
Under this regime, countries that highly value cultural homogeneity, for 
example, might prefer not to accept refugees, but prefer to financially 
support refugee resettlement elsewhere.162 Schuck makes the point that 
some countries have already adopted this solution to some extent, since 
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in certain refugee crises States that do not wish to accept refugees have 
instead supported the countries of first asylum.163 
The critics of this approach, namely, Anker, Fitzpatrick, and Shack-
nove, claim that this proposal is not feasible.164 Furthermore, critics ar-
gue that this is yet another way of confining refugees to the developing 
States, not a meaningful opportunity for responsibility sharing.165 The 
idea that States will be able to bargain effectively and equitably over qu-
otas is unrealistic, given the imbalance of power among States.166 Final-
ly, this solution can be criticized for treating refugees like commodi-
ties167 as well as for being derived from a utilitarian, rather than a distri-
butive justice point of view.168 Although Schuck has rejected or ad-
dressed these critiques, he admits that his proposal is somewhat proble-
matic and that it should be given more thought.169 
E. State of Origin Liability 
Another approach of responsibility sharing proposes that the States of 
origin should be held liable for their externality, in the sense that refu-
gees’ host countries could demand compensation from them.170 While 
hosting States provide only surrogate protection, this mechanism returns 
to the principle that a State’s primary responsibility is towards its own 
nationals, a fundamental idea in international law.171 
Scholars and experts in refugee law have previously recognized the 
need to hold States liable for the causes of refugees flight, arguing that 
refugees should receive compensation from their countries of origin.172 
Unfortunately, this idea, while receiving some attention during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, has since received little scholarly attention. At first, it 
was linked exclusively to the idea of repatriating refugees.173 Eventually, 
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it was also understood to be a notion supported by human rights norms in 
domestic and international laws.174 
This proposal materialized when the International Law Association 
drafted the Cairo Declaration of Principles of International Law on Com-
pensation to Refugees in 1992 (“Cairo Declaration”).175 The Cairo Decla-
ration stipulates, inter alia, that “[a] state is obligated to compensate its 
own nationals forced to leave their homes to the same extent as it is obli-
gated by international law to compensate an alien.”176 However, the fra-
mers were concerned that if refugees were given the right to seek com-
pensation from their States of origin, then host Governments would be 
reluctant to assist them. Therefore, another principle of the Cairo Decla-
ration specifies the following: 
The possibility that refugees or UNHCR may one day successfully 
claim compensation from the country of origin should not serve as a 
pretext for withholding humanitarian assistance to refugees or refusing 
to join in international burden-sharing meant to meet the needs of refu-
gees or otherwise to provide durable solutions, including mediation to 
facilitate voluntary repatriation in dignity and security, thereby remov-
ing or reducing the necessity to pay compensation.177 
The idea that a State is also liable to other States that provide for its na-
tionals compliments the aims of the Cairo Declaration to protect all refu-
gees and negates the aforementioned risk that host Governments will be 
disinclined to aid immigrants. According to the Declaration’s rationale, 
States of origin have a duty to refrain from acts that would cause injury 
or damage to persons or property situated in the territory of other States, 
in this case, host States.178 Naturally, the States of origin should not be 
unfairly burdened; thus, governments should not be required to compen-
sate both the host States and the refugees for the same damages. The 
concept of State of origin liability was implemented in the context of the 
Geneva Accord, a model peace agreement proposed to resolve the Israe-
li-Palestinian conflict.179 Article 7(3) of the Geneva Accord asserts that 
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“[t]he Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian 
refugees to remuneration.”180 
Typically, in circumstances resulting in refugee flight, the State of ori-
gin is liable for the externality where the government fails to protect the 
refugee.181 However, some events causing refugee and refugee-like situa-
tions cannot be attributed to the State of origin, rather the immigration is 
the result of a force majeure.182 This is the case, for example, with natu-
ral disasters, outside coercion or aggression like war or occupation, or 
conditions the State is unable to protect against.183 
Generally speaking, though, the liability of the State of origin to the 
host State could be justified on several grounds. First, the country of ori-
gin has breached the sovereignty of the host State by forcing it, so to 
speak, to accept its nationals, as well as disrupting the “order” of natio-
nality in the world.184 Second, one could argue that a “quasi-contractual” 
relationship exists between the host State and the State of origin, which 
establishes grounds for compensation.185 
Through a liability rule, the State of origin would internalize the cost 
of its externality, which cannot be accomplished through any of the other 
mechanisms proposed. It should be stressed that in this context a liability 
rule is necessary and that any other property allocation rules would be 
insufficient, since the transaction costs are immense and the parties are 
not necessarily rational.186 
State of origin liability has several positive and negative aspects. Re-
garding the former, State of origin liability creates incentives for both 
host States and States of origin, thereby optimizing the protection of the 
rights of refugees. In particular, it seems that this mechanism would 
create the proper ex ante incentives for States of origin to prevent the 
flight of refugees. This could positively translate into increased efforts by 
these States to achieve economic growth and promote the just distribu-
tion of resources in order to provide for and ensure the adequate living 
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conditions of their citizens, thereby discouraging immigration in a con-
structive manner. Hence, if applied correctly, the liability rule may not 
only distribute the responsibility of providing for refugees more fairly, 
but also decrease the number of refugees in the world. It is important to 
stress that, under this compensation regime, States of origin cannot 
excuse themselves from compensating host States by claiming that the 
host States could have applied stricter immigration policies. Such reason-
ing does not conform to the basic principles of human rights.187 
While promising, the liability rule raises some questions. There is a 
risk that, in some cases, this mechanism could lead States to impose re-
strictions on the freedom of movement in order to prevent some individ-
uals from emigrating. Consequently, this mechanism should be applied 
only if the right to exit a country is protected and there are serious sanc-
tions for States that create such restrictions in an attempt to avoid liabili-
ty.188 
Enforcement could also be a difficult.189 States of origin may be reluc-
tant to be held liable. The ability to collect compensation from impove-
rished, developing countries is problematic, although there may be ways 
around this.190 
Additionally, this compensation system could, in fact, serve as a means 
of preserving the unjust distribution of wealth, as the countries of origin 
would have to pay money to the host countries, which are frequently 
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wealthier.191 Imposing additional financial obligations on countries of 
origin could cause their domestic situations to deteriorate further, which, 
in turn, could cause another mass outpouring of refugees. Therefore, this 
compensation mechanism should only be applied with care and after 
close consideration of each country of origin’s situation and capabilities. 
F. Addressing the Core of the Problem192 
The final responsibility-sharing proposal is to address problems in the 
countries causing the immigration of refugees and to offer assistance in 
resolving them.193 This could be accomplished in various ways, including 
offering financial aid, transferring knowledge, providing military assis-
tance, or engaging in humanitarian intervention.194 Of course, some of 
these measures risk violating a State’s sovereignty, but at times they 
might be more effective than attempts to regain control over a deteri-
orated situation. As each of these measures can be costly, they should be 
borne by the different countries in a proportionate manner.195 Thielemann 
and Dewan suggest that this mechanism is most effective when it utilizes 
each country’s competitive advantage. For example, a country with a 
strong military force could undertake military intervention or peacekeep-
ing, whereas a country with a great deal of vacant land and a small popu-
lation could absorb many immigrants, while a country with many in-
vestment resources could assist the country of origin in furthering devel-
opment.196 In sum, countries can shield themselves from the responsibili-
ty of providing for refugees by directly assisting the countries of origin. 
Although desirable, it is often very difficult to address the root causes 
of immigration. While this discussion is complex and beyond the scope 
of this Article, it suffices to say that, unfortunately, States have been 
relatively reluctant to offer foreign aid to countries of origin and the aid 
that has been offered has seldom been helpful.197 Also, it is unclear 
whether improving conditions in the States of origin will have an impact 
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on the migration figures, both in the short-term and long-term.198 There-
fore, while foreign aid is generally morally commendable, it may not 
always efficiently serve as a means of sharing responsibility for refugees. 
G. Choosing Among Mechanisms 
The mechanisms of responsibility sharing detailed above each offer 
costs and benefits. Ideally, a number of factors should be considered 
when choosing among these approaches. The first, and most important, 
consideration should be which mechanisms States are more willing to 
accept and apply, with respect to their political constraints and prefe-
rences.199 Feasibility is particularly critical. A State’s ability to adopt one 
mechanism over another may change over time, depending on various 
constraints, including the preferences of its citizens. Therefore, there 
should be some flexibility allowing States to utilize different mechan-
isms at different times. Another consideration is the extent to which the 
chosen mechanism protects the human rights of the refugees. Finally, 
responsibility should be assigned in a manner that is sensitive to the dif-
ferent, and often contradicting, moral considerations discussed in Parts II 
and III of this Article. 
H. Applying Several Responsibility-Sharing Mechanisms 
It is possible to apply more than one responsibility-sharing mechanism 
simultaneously. For instance, in some parts of the world, one mechanism 
may provide the answer to the responsibility-sharing problem, whereas 
another mechanism may be preferable elsewhere. Mechanisms can also 
overlap to some extent. For example, state of origin liability could gener-
ally apply in conjunction with another mechanism of responsibility shar-
ing serving as a backup in cases where the State of origin cannot be held 
liable. Again, the key in combining the different mechanisms should be 
feasibility as well as the human rights of the refugees. 
Instead of establishing one mechanism to fit all immigration crises, it 
is advisable to develop a general understanding among States that there 
is an international responsibility to solve these crises through cooperation 
and to fit the particular responsibility-sharing mechanism(s) with the 
specific characteristics of a given refugee crisis. The need to foster such 
understanding is supported, for example, by the position of some scho-
lars that States are wary of long-term cooperation regimes.200 
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There are several disadvantages to a policy of tailoring a responsibili-
ty-sharing mechanism to a specific immigration crisis. Defining the 
scope of responsibility and assigning it on an individual basis takes time 
and involves substantial transaction costs, as it requires studying the pat-
terns of migration and their causes, and estimating the costs of protecting 
refugees. As mentioned above, the duty of nonrefoulement affords time 
to evaluate the situation and develop an appropriate burden-sharing me-
chanism.201 Nevertheless, due to the complexity of refugee crises, it is 
necessary to match a specific solution to a specific crisis, while taking 
into account the criteria discussed in Parts II and III. For example, with 
each new refugee crisis, responding States would have to determine 
which countries have sufficient wealth and solidarity with the State of 
origin, as well as which countries possibly bear moral responsibility for 
the crisis. 
VI. COORDINATING THE EFFORTS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
SHARING 
An outstanding question is who should select and implement the cho-
sen responsibility-sharing mechanism(s). Efforts to coordinate responsi-
bility sharing tend to be complicated and costly. While States play an 
important role in negotiating and tailoring them, they are usually unwil-
ling to assume further liabilities and responsibilities. As we cannot rely 
on individual States to switch voluntarily to a more just responsibility-
sharing regime, it is important that this effort be coordinated by an inter-
national organization like the United Nations. 
The United Nations and its subordinate organizations are the most ap-
propriate bodies to determine which responsibility-sharing mechanisms 
best fulfill the above-mentioned moral obligations. The United Nations is 
comprised of many States, each with different constraints and priorities, 
and therefore, it constitutes the most suitable forum in which to make 
such decisions. In addition, the United Nations is the appropriate authori-
ty to monitor the application of burden-sharing mechanisms. This is true 
for a number of reasons, including, as stated above, the fact that, in sev-
eral legal documents, the United Nations has embraced the principle of 
promoting and improving economic stability through international assis-
tance.202 If the United Nations were in charge of coordinating responsi-
bility sharing, then States would have a duty to comply with responsibili-
ty-sharing efforts as a part of their good-faith duty to cooperate and sup-
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port the actions of the United Nations.203 In fact, the UNHCR already 
facilitates responsibility-sharing mechanisms in the context of refugees 
and displaced persons.204 The UNHCR collects donations from States 
and private donors and uses these resources to provide for such persons 
around the world, thus implementing a model of responsibility sharing. 
Defined according to its statute as a nonpolitical, humanitarian, and so-
cial body, the UNHCR has substantive expertise and an apolitical charac-
ter that make it the most appropriate entity to oversee the distribution of 
responsibility.205 Some may be skeptical that the UNHCR, which is com-
prised of representatives from different States, would remain strictly apo-
litical and humanitarian. This concern is unfounded when one considers 
that all U.N. Member States are represented in the UNHCR, including 
those that have an interest in actualizing a fairer responsibility-sharing 
regime. Moreover, under some of the proposed mechanisms, the States 
would have incentives to cooperate and strengthen the UNHCR.206 
It should be noted, however, that presently the UNHCR system for dis-
tributing resources does not necessarily resolve the unfairness of the cur-
rent responsibility-sharing situation. In fact, due to various financial con-
straints, resources are disproportionately used to assist refugees in the 
European countries, which are usually better off and receive fewer refu-
gees than Africa and Asia.207 The UNHCR itself has expressed concern 
on several occasions that responsibility is currently not fairly distri-
buted,208 and has made efforts to harmonize immigration norms in the 
hopes of increasing cooperation.209 Nonetheless, discussions within the 
UNHCR about responsibility sharing fail to account for moral considera-
tions in a conscientious manner. 
Some scholars have proposed increasing UNHCR involvement such 
that refugees could only seek protection in “international territories of 
asylum,” areas that do not belong to any specific country, but are leased 
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by the UNHCR.210 Although this proposal may avoid the difficulty of 
assimilating refugees in specific States, it is a highly problematic ap-
proach. It is likely that the UNHCR would be unable to provide a territo-
ry of asylum accessible to all immigrants, and this scheme runs the risk 
of creating “ghettos” of refugees around the world. These problems 
demonstrate the consequences of ignoring the moral considerations that 
must be an element within any responsibility-sharing regime. 
A detailed description of how the UNHCR should or could implement 
responsibility-sharing mechanisms to handle refugee crises is beyond the 
scope of this Article. However, it is nevertheless important to describe, in 
general terms, the main roles the UNHCR would have in applying the 
aforementioned responsibility-sharing mechanisms. Generally, with re-
spect to any approach, the UNHCR would have to facilitate the process 
of weighing the different considerations outlined in Parts II and III to 
determine which responsibility-sharing mechanism is most appropriate, 
delineate its specifications, and enforce the agreement. For example, with 
respect to the option of setting quotas and establishing regional agree-
ments or trading quotas, the UNHCR would oversee the process of estab-
lishing these options and see that countries fulfill their responsibility. If 
the options of trading quotas, taxation, or compensation were preferred, 
then the UNHCR would determine the appropriate amount of money that 
should be transferred. With respect to State of origin liability, the 
UNHCR would facilitate compensating the host countries. Efforts to 
claim the compensation could be made either directly by the host country 
or through the UNHCR.211 
Regardless of the particular role the UNHCR would play in a future re-
sponsibility-sharing regime, it would have to develop a stronger political 
presence in international relations212 to establish and enforce the mechan-
ism(s). In order to be effective, the UNHCR would have to gather infor-
mation about the needs of asylum seekers, state capacity, and com-
pliance, all of which fall well within its province. Moreover, it would 
need to assume the authority to enforce the agreed-upon norms.213 
In addition to the UNHCR, international and domestic courts could 
play a significant role in coordinating and supervising responsibility 
sharing. When reviewing individual cases of asylum seekers or principle 
cases of asylum policy, courts could examine each States’ restrictive mi-
gration policies within the broader context of global migration trends, 
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rather than viewing the immigration of refugees to the country as an iso-
lated event. Evidence of the willingness of some courts to take general 
migration patterns into consideration can be found in domestic court de-
cisions already handed down.214 Additionally, domestic and international 
courts could have jurisdiction to review responsibility-sharing agree-
ments among States. Although these agreements are diplomatic in nature 
and courts often refrain from examining them, because they touch heavi-
ly upon human rights issues and constitutional questions, courts in juris-
dictions well versed in these subjects may be well-equipped to consider 
them.215 
In addition, it is possible to expect some cooperation among courts in 
unifying protection standards and preventing government attempts to 
evade them by overburdening other States. As Eyal Benvenisti recently 
noted in a different context, domestic courts might be willing to “join 
forces to offer meaningful judicial review of government action, even 
intergovernmental action.”216 In other words, courts could work together 
to provide coordinated judicial review over questions of responsibility 
sharing brought before them, considering each others’ decisions and 
creating a unified standard of protection. Despite the substantive difficul-
ties in coordinating such actions, recent decisions in refugee law indicate 
that courts might be willing to resist their own States’ policies in favor of 
a unifying judicial principle.217 
CONCLUSION  
Host countries must allocate resources to provide for refugees. There is 
no moral justification for these costs to be disproportionately borne by 
some countries and not others. Yet, there have not been enough incen-
tives for States to create fair responsibility-sharing mechanisms. This is 
primarily the result of the fact that the countries that bear the majority of 
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the burden are not very politically influential, and cannot compel other 
countries to assume some of the responsibility. In this Article, I have dis-
cussed several mechanisms of responsibility sharing. While there is no 
one perfect solution for the problem, it seems that one or more of these 
mechanisms should be applied, albeit with an awareness of the risks that 
each carries. Since all of the responsibility-sharing mechanisms are im-
perfect, and no solution achieves just distribution in all potential refugee 
crises, there is a need for additional research. 
It should be noted, though, that in no time in our history has human-
kind been more technologically equipped than today to apply mechan-
isms of responsibility sharing. Given the moral duty and the ability to 
carry out responsibility-sharing plans, at present, it is reasonable to aim 
for a fairer system. However, without dismissing the significance of in-
ternational responsibility sharing and the urgent need to establish me-
chanisms for immigration crises, States are nevertheless obligated to re-
spond in circumstances where such mechanisms have yet to be formed: 
States cannot excuse themselves from fulfilling their obligations towards 
needy refugees merely because other States fail in their duties. Even in 
today’s world, which lacks efficient responsibility-sharing mechanisms, 
there is a morally compelling reason for all States to recognize their obli-
gation to protect refugees. 
